We've established that Patrick Wall's research indicates an appropriate motor response needs to be fulfilled to resolve pain. We've discussed what an appropriate motor response consists of.
We've considered that the motor response depends upon the context.
In order for the appropriate motor response to be expressed, the appropriate context must be present.
At this point it is helpful to review our general statement:
Those treatments which satisfy the needed action sequence in the context of resolving pain, which is synonymous with eliminating threat, will be successful.
Ways in which the threatening contexts are reduced were presented. Now, we need to talk about the actual expression of the motor plan.
It is time to discuss ideomotion.
From an earlier post:
First, let me provide a very clear cut instance of ideomotion. Experiments have been carried out on people with parietal lobe lesions. This lesion does not allow a person to percieve an object in their visual field. The problem is not with the eyes, so they can make a neural map of the object, but they cannot process it. Therefore, they do not percieve the object. If you hold up an apple in front of them and ask what or where it is, they won't know. But an interesting thing happens: p12 "Bypassing the Will":
In their mind, they thought they were just guessing. But they guessed accurately. They were able to carry out a motor plan correctly but could not percieve it. Ideomotion...non-consious movement.
You might now say, "Well that's great, but a normal person could percieve the apple, and the motion would therefore be concious."
That seems logical, but the truth may surprise you: p. 14-15
So, it turns out that the movements we think we have conscious control of, are actually ideomotion.
From p. 13:
Throughout this article, Bargh shows that the motor plans are determined by context. What we see, for example, creates a motor plan (remember that you can only sense those things to which you can make a motor plan). If we had no consciousness we would be very impulsive. Bargh describes a patient who had a brain lesion in which every environmental stimuli caused the corresponding output of the motor plan. If he saw a bed in someone else's house, he would get naked and go to sleep in it. He did not possess the inhibitory ability of consiousness.
Remember that we discussed the core self as it compares to the autobiographical self, which supplies context based on past experience. This patient did not have access to the autobiographical self which would have supplied the contextual clues that it is inappropriate to climb into someone else's bed that way. We are not consiously changing the motor plan, the inhibitory context used a different motor plan, the carrying out of which was still ideomotion.
That is an example of a useful inhibitory context provided by the autobiographical self. For those in pain however, it is this inhibition of the expression of the appropriate motor response through ideomotion that frustrates the progression through the action sequence.
So the mystery behind ideomotion is not how to elicit it, it is how to allow ideomotor expression within the correct context.
Next generality: those interventions which allow the ideomotor expression of the appropriate motor response will be successful
I'm not sure I've made my point clearly here, so please bring the comments.
We've considered that the motor response depends upon the context.
In order for the appropriate motor response to be expressed, the appropriate context must be present.
At this point it is helpful to review our general statement:
Those treatments which satisfy the needed action sequence in the context of resolving pain, which is synonymous with eliminating threat, will be successful.
Ways in which the threatening contexts are reduced were presented. Now, we need to talk about the actual expression of the motor plan.
It is time to discuss ideomotion.
From an earlier post:
The carrying out of a non-conscious motor plan, such as we have been describing, is called ideomotion. Wall calls it "overt motor movements."
those with lesions in the ventral-visual system could not recognize or identify the item but were nonetheless able to reach for it correctly when asked in a casual manner to take it from the experimenter.
You might now say, "Well that's great, but a normal person could percieve the apple, and the motion would therefore be concious."
That seems logical, but the truth may surprise you: p. 14-15
A person cannot possibly think about and be consciously aware of all of the individual muscle actions in compound and sequential movements – there are too many of them and they are too fast (see, e.g., Thach, 1996). They therefore can occur only through some process that is automatic and subconscious. Empirical support for this conclusion comes from a recent study by Fourneret and Jeannerod (1998). Participants attempted to trace a line displayed on a computer monitor, but with their drawing hand hidden from them by a mirror. Thus they were not able to see how their hand actually moved in order to reproduce the drawing; they had to refer to a graphical representation of that movement on a computer monitor in front of them. However, unknown to the participants, substantial bias had been programmed into the translation of their actual movement onto that which was displayed on the screen, so that the displayed line did not actually move in the same direction as had their drawing hand. Despite this, all participants felt and reported great confidence that their hand had indeed moved in the direction shown on the screen. This could only have occurred if normal participants have little or no direct conscious access to their actual hand movements.
From p. 13:
Jeannerod (in press) has similarly argued that there exist two different representations of the same object, one “pragmatic” and the other “semantic”. The former are actional, used for interacting with the object; the latter are for knowing about and identifying the object.
Remember that we discussed the core self as it compares to the autobiographical self, which supplies context based on past experience. This patient did not have access to the autobiographical self which would have supplied the contextual clues that it is inappropriate to climb into someone else's bed that way. We are not consiously changing the motor plan, the inhibitory context used a different motor plan, the carrying out of which was still ideomotion.
That is an example of a useful inhibitory context provided by the autobiographical self. For those in pain however, it is this inhibition of the expression of the appropriate motor response through ideomotion that frustrates the progression through the action sequence.
So the mystery behind ideomotion is not how to elicit it, it is how to allow ideomotor expression within the correct context.
Next generality: those interventions which allow the ideomotor expression of the appropriate motor response will be successful
I'm not sure I've made my point clearly here, so please bring the comments.
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