Diane
30-12-2007, 10:59 PM
Before anyone asks, yes, eliminativism (http://www.google.ca/search?hl=en&q=define%3A+eliminativism&btnG=Google+Search&meta=lr%3Dlang_en%7Clang_es) is a real word. I did not make it up.
Hardcastle uses it in discussing (in the course of dispelling) the idea of psychogenic pain in her book, The Myth of Pain (see here (http://www.somasimple.com/forums/showthread.php?t=4824) for more).
The gist of the context surrounding her use of this word is that medical practitioners persist in diagnosing much pain as psychogenic. She says, no, there is a material basis for pain. Chronic pain felt physically is not mental in origin, she asserts, after having deftly deconstructed all the studies that are floating around that would suggest otherwise, describing all the confounds, poor design, problems with methodology, faulty logic... (sound familiar?). This in a group (medical practitioners) that prides itself on having a materialist basis.
Her question (p. 39) is, Why doesn't materialism lead to pure and simple eliminativism? If we take materialism seriously, then why wouldn't we claim that our ultimate goal in explaining psychogenic pain is to reduce our pain states and other related mental events to their insubstantiating cellular interactions, thus eliminating the former for a discussion of the latter?
This means, applying Occam's Razor to one's own mental constructs first. Something I approve of. Then, if one still needs to steer carefully between whirlpools and sea monsters (http://www.friendsinlowplaces.co.uk/sea_monster_and_the_whirlpool.htm), out there in the clinical world, in the culture, fine, but at least one should have one's own conceptual house in order and well maintained.
Hardcastle uses it in discussing (in the course of dispelling) the idea of psychogenic pain in her book, The Myth of Pain (see here (http://www.somasimple.com/forums/showthread.php?t=4824) for more).
The gist of the context surrounding her use of this word is that medical practitioners persist in diagnosing much pain as psychogenic. She says, no, there is a material basis for pain. Chronic pain felt physically is not mental in origin, she asserts, after having deftly deconstructed all the studies that are floating around that would suggest otherwise, describing all the confounds, poor design, problems with methodology, faulty logic... (sound familiar?). This in a group (medical practitioners) that prides itself on having a materialist basis.
Her question (p. 39) is, Why doesn't materialism lead to pure and simple eliminativism? If we take materialism seriously, then why wouldn't we claim that our ultimate goal in explaining psychogenic pain is to reduce our pain states and other related mental events to their insubstantiating cellular interactions, thus eliminating the former for a discussion of the latter?
This means, applying Occam's Razor to one's own mental constructs first. Something I approve of. Then, if one still needs to steer carefully between whirlpools and sea monsters (http://www.friendsinlowplaces.co.uk/sea_monster_and_the_whirlpool.htm), out there in the clinical world, in the culture, fine, but at least one should have one's own conceptual house in order and well maintained.